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Article 8

Book Reviews
Tbe Sacred River: Coleridge's Theory of the Imagination by James V. Baker.
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957. Pp. xiv + 308. $4.50.
Writers are inclined to pontificate a little hastily upon Coleridge's aesthetics;

it is good to have a book by a scholar who has spent years saturating himself in
his subject. In focussing upon the theory of imagination, Professor Baker has
gone to the heart of the matter. He emphasizes three aspects: imagination as
organic, imagination as reconciling opposites, and imagination developing in the
unconscious before emerging into consciousness. In these three seminal ideas
he has seen the underlying unity, the Coleridgean one in the many. Rene Wellek
in a tone of mild disparagement has tenned Coleridge's criticism eclectic and
unsystematic; amidst the diversity, the persistent reliance upon this trinity of
related ideas righdy commands attention.
Professor Baker's exposition is richly laden. All the relevant writers of the
Romantic and earlier periods are quoted and discussed: the Germans are not
neglected for the English or vice-versa; Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus fit into
their places. The study looks after as well as before, to the many later developments in thought which Coleridge anticipated. These many glancings give the
book an authentic density. Nearly all of the ground has already been gone over
in one way or another and much will be familiar to specialists. But the tight
collocation of ideas from so many writers into a systematic presentation serves as
a useful review, renews old awarenesses, and suggests new ones.
For example, Baker's detailed scrutiny of the eighteenth-century mechanists,
against whose passive view of the mind Coleridge waged relentless war, reveals
how often these men were forced to recognize a creative element in cognition.
Even the arch-enemy, the sceptical Hume, was aware of the creative role of
imagination-though, like his successor 1. A. Richards, he might have been little
interested in Akenside's and Coleridge's conviction that imagination in its highest
potency offered intimations of the supernatural. Baker righdy notes that Coleridge'S polemical zeal against mechanism, the result of his religious commitments,
sometimes throws his criticism a little off balance. It accounts for his excessive
disparagement of "fancy" and "association," for his perhaps too sharp cleavage
between "fancy" and "imagination," and for his occasional failure to recognize
the creativity of unconscious association.
Two chapters of special interest are those on the unconscious and on modern
critical views of Coleridge. In the first are included Coleridge's interesting observations on dreams; also, in discussing Freud, Baker makes the point that Freud
and Coleridge are both alike rationalists in the great Western tradition. In looking
through the other chapter a reader might conclude that when a modern critic
comments on Coleridge he reveals as much about himself as about his subject, or
perhaps more. Baker is usually on the side of his Ancient when he feels a Modern
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has misunderstood or disparaged. Yet he is never blindly partisan. He believes
Eliot's emphasis upon conscious workmanship in art is a necessary corrective to
some of Coleridge's ideas. Here it may be noted that conscious workmanship
is not the absolute opposite of that less conscious creation of genius which
Coleridge was fond of extolling. Even in the midst of a deliberate effort to solve
an intellectual or artistic problem, the right unification can still come suddenly,
as though the final fitting together has occurred one Imows not quite how.
A book usually has the defects of its qualities. Amid his dozens of citations
from other writers, Professor Baker does not always drive his own point home.
He believes that too sharp a distinction between fancy and imagination should
not be drawn; he quotes Coleridge'S example of merely fanciful verse from
Butler's Hudibras:
And like a lobster boyl'd the Morn
From black to red began to turn.
Would it not be possible to come right out and say that when considering such
a passage it is manifestly wrong to talk, as Coleridge does, of the simile and its
referents as "fixities" and "definites"; to deny that they interact vitally? In
their humble way these lines exhibit just that sort of interanimation or mutual
modification which Coleridge thought the imagination should bring to pass:
the grotesque figure imparts some of its tone to the morning and to the poem
as a whole; the poem gives some of its own vigor to the figure.
In a still more important matter Professor Baker might himself have taken a
little stronger hand in presenting his subject. He believes that when 1. A. Richards
adopted Coleridge's critical ideas but discarded his metaphysical assumptions,
he was discarding the very element that gave these ideas their intelligible unity.
Out of proper respect for his own opinion and for Coleridge's. he might have
presented his reasons, if not in twenty pages, at least in four or five. Baker has
offered a clue when he insists that Coleridge regarded the imagination as symbolic.
But precisely because the term symbol has become a shibboleth in modern
criticism, it is dangerous for an author to be too polite, to assume that of course
his readers know precisely what he means when he uses the term. A reader
without a strong grounding in idealistic philosophy might well feel that all
the materials have been assembled here to demonstrate the unity of three of
Coleridge's key ideas, but that the demonstration is never quite made.
Professor Baker's deepest agreement with Coleridge appears to be religious,
a fact which may partially explain his reticence. Again, the agreement is partly
philosophic, if philosophy and religion can here be distinguished. Coleridge
owed an early and a great debt to the older English and Greek idealists, but
Baker believes, quite rightly, that he often found in the German tradition from
Leibniz to Schelling the most distinct formulations of the ideas that were growing
in his mind. Here, where even the heavily-armed Wellek has failed, Baker is
understandably reluctant to launch another full-scale attack on the citadel of
Anglo-Saxon impercipience; after all, T. S. Eliot himself stands on the battlements
cheering on the defenders.
Leibniz viewed all existence, physical and mental, as manifesting one vital
process, essentially an image-making process, developing through successive phases;
Schelling, in his own post-Kantian terms, viewed the world similarly. These
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philosophies do not solve all difficulties, but theJ71 ct.mstitute an intellectual reduction as astounding in its way as that effected in our own time for the physical
world by Alben Einstein; they were not only prophetic of changes to come but
through their influence helped bring these changes to pass. One might even
suggest that it was no accident that Einstein's successful quest for unity at a
very high level of abstraction was achieved in the country of Leibniz and
Schelling. An anti-metaphysical critic may point out truly enough that he makes
his own discoveries with the help of Coleridge's humbler and more concrete
observations, just as good work can still be done in the sciences without taking
Einstein's theory into account. But these pragmatic facts do not invalidate the
higher theories. In shorr, even after Copernican revolutions in thought many old
categories and mental constructs can still be used fruitfully, and this fruitfulness
does not prove the revolution to have been without significance. Here perhaps
Baker is a little hasty when he suggests that Coletidge's old-fashioned "facultypsychology" is outmoded by his own organic theory of mind. In the words of
John Donne, an idealistic metaphysic is a prince lying in prison until it descends
to faculties. But after a revolution the old categories must on occasion be used
with a difference, and Baker righdy notes that Coleridge sometimes forgets
this difference.
Although Professor Baker shows considerable familiarity with the Teutonic
mysteries, his commentaries on them .are sometimes misleading. In considering
the relevance of Immanuel Kant to the general subject, it is not enough to
recount what Kant has to say upon the imagination; rlle philosopher usually
employs this term in a limited sense only. One must consider all that is said
in the first part of the Critique of Judgment about the beautiful as a symbol,
about the organic unity of the creations of artistic genius perhaps intimating the
existen~e of one "supersensible substrate" underlying the di~hotomous worlds
of experience. Here Kant is talking about imagination in the full Coleridgean
sense; here he finally reveals himself, for all his critical hedgings, to have been
a crypto-Platonist after ali, secredy undermining the structure of modem
scepticism from within. At least so his last critique was interpreted by his
successors in Germany.
Again, in writing on the distinction in the Biographia Literaria between the
Primary and Secondary Imaginations, Baker seems to suggest that the primary
imagination is a rather passive sort of poetic perception, as when Dorothy Wordsworth, without creating a fully formed poem in response to her experience, feels
a birch tree to be a spirit. Unless I am mistaken on this recondite point, anything
which common sense would regard as in the least "poetical" would be verging
upon the domain of Coleridge's Secondary power. His Primary Imagination,
as derived from Schelling, is simply the ability of rlle human mind to take its
scattered and fragmentary sense perceptions and build these up into the matterof-fact world that it knows, of trees, houses, people, solid and substantial, existing
in time and space.
Related to this matter is one difficulty which recurs several times in the book.
According to Coleridge'S own vitalistic theory, the mind is creative even in its
unconscious workings. Yet Professor Baker sometimes may leave an unwary
reader with the conviction that the Coleridgean distinction between active and
passive is the same as that between conscious and unconscious. When Coleridge
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is using the terms in the precise sense appropriate to his own theory, the distinctions are different. Coleridge himself and the natural abstruseness of the subject
are largely to blame if there is some confusion here.
A few generations ago, in such men as Latta, Royce, and Watson, the EngIishspeaking world produced lucid expositors of the German higher philosophies.
These men could be profitably re-read today. This reviewer has no wish to
suggest that metaphysics is the same as literary criticism, or that it sho~d
displace literary criticism. Yet Professor Baker, after giving so much thought
to his subject, believes that in Coleridge's case the lofty speculations liberated and
enriched the more practical observations. It is still fashionable to maintain the
contrary. But sometimes the very writers who express this opposite opinion
admit that they are not truly acquainted with that metaphysic which they suppose
to have been more a hindrance to Coleridge than a help.

Southern Illinois University

JAMES BENZIGER

The Rational and Social Foundations of Music by Max Weber. Translated and
edited by Don Martindale, Johannes Riedel, and Gertrude Neuwirth. Carbondale, illinois: Southe,n illinois University Press, 1958. Pp. Iii 148. $5.75.

+

Max Weber's importance in present-day sociology can scarcely be exaggerated.
Although his death occurred in 1920, his sociological studies, the major ones
published posthumously, have still the impact of fresh and up-to-date thinking.
Yet a search for contemporary American reviews of his monumental Wirtschaft
und Gesellschaft (1921) reveals that the book was ignored; it seems safe to say
that during his lifetime Weber was almost completely unknown on this side of
the water. It is only during the last thirty years or so that his theoretical writings
have been recognized by American sociologists as extremely fruitful and in many
ways pertinent to the fundamental sociological problem of devising a conceptual
apparatus in terms of which human social behavior may be comprehended.
In these days of specialization the breadth of Weber's knowledge is amazing.
His studies had apparendy no imposed limits of time or place, he was a synthesizing and comparative historian of economics, politics, jurisprudence, religion, mili~
tarism, society, and lmowledge. He viewed sociology as a kind of natural science
that seeks to recognize regularities which may be stated as laws but that differs
from other natural sciences in two important respects: in its concern with
meaning and motivation in contrast to the lack of concern, for example, of
chemistry with the personal values of a molecule of gas; and in its view of the
laws of society, once derived, not as things in themselves but rather as instruments by means of which the discovery of causal interrelationships of historical
phenomena is facilitated. Weber's sociology is concerned with regularities in
meaningful social action and, in contrast to modern sociological functionalism,
find the reality of social systems to exist in the probabilities of occurrence of
predicted social actions.
In connection with the establishing of constructs by means of which to char-
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acterize these stabilized patterns of social interaction, Weber perceived several
qualitatively different themes, or motives, around which values and actions are
organized. He calls the more important of these rational, evaluative, and traditional; all involve the relationship between means and ends in one way Of
another, but the theme of "rationality" connotes, in Webcr'·s terms, complete
freedom of choice of ends, while means are chosen purely for their efficiency;
and the whole process entails a constant attempt to reduce everything to inflexible rules, laws, or conceptual models. It is Weber's contention-a leitmotif
that runs through all his works-that Western Civilization alone of all the cultures
of the world may be characterized by its great and continually increasing reliance
on rational social action.
In view of tllls background it is understandable that the publication of the
first English translation of Weber's essay on The Rational and Social Foundations
of Music should be greeted with considerable enthusiasm by anyone interested
in the sociology of music. The essay was apparently written in 1911 but was
not published until 1921 when it appeared twice, once as a monograph and once
as an appendix to Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. The present edition represents
an attempt of Martindale, Riedel, and Neuwirth, all associated with the University
of Minnesota, to give a wider audience to Weber's pioneering treatise.
And, indeed, they seem to have done their best to make a book out of it.
An extended introduction, a bit more than a third as long as the essay itself,
gives information on Weber's ideas and attempts to explain the essay in terms
of them. They have split the originally uninterrupted essay into seven chapters
and assigned appropriate headings. They have provided extensive annotation,
including many citations from the ethnomusicological literature since Weber's
time. Yet the book as a whole is disappointing, for two reasons. First, the
translation has a tendency to be literal. Weber's German was never easy to read,
but this is no reason for the translators to render the essay almost unreadable
in English. Their preference for English cognates of the German terms employed
by Weber, rather than more familiar English words having the same mealllngs,
results often in a kind of gibberish running completely counter to that rule of
English-if not German-scholarly style demanding clarity, precision, and unequivocal communication of ideas. This is not to say that the meaning is not
there; only that one has to fight for it far harder than he should be expected to,
and often harder than the results justify. For example,: "By adding another
third to a triad, dissonant seventh chords are formed. The most important is
the dominant seventh chord built on the dominant of the key with its major
seventh as the third which characterizes the key univocally since it appears only
in this key and in this composition as a series of thirds made out of scalable tone
material." Let us examine the second of these sentences. We find the words
"univocally," "composition," and "scalable" here, each in its own way subverting ready comprehension. For the first, "unequivocally," a much more
common word, could have been used and, particularly in terms of Weber's
discussion of "polyvocality," would have been less misleading. "Composition,"
in a musical context, inevitably suggests a musical work; the reader is thus quite
likely to waste some time in trying to identify the particular composition-since
one has not previously been mentioned-to which Weber is referring before
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he realizes that in this case Webef is talking about the form of the chord.
" Scalable" can be confusing until one understands that "scalable tone material"
just means tones of the scale. With these three potential stumbling blocks out
of the way the sentence is still not immediately clear, for the major seventh of
the dominant of a key is certainly not" the third which characterizes the key,"
and since dominant seventh chords are under discussion the major seventh of
the dominant is in any case irrelevant. Of course, it soon becomes evident that
the major seventh of the key and the third of the dominant seventh chord arc
meant, and that it is the entire dominant seventh chord which characterizes the
key, and the passage makes sense. But the whole process is simply not worth
the effort, particularly since the sentence is not very important. The passage
just vivisected is, unfortunately, typical of the entire essay. It was Weber's
privilege to w.rite in ambiguous fashion, and German scholars are to some extent
used to this sort of thing. but a translator attempting to introduce Weber's work
to an English-reading audience of sociologists and musicologists should do
better than this.
The second source of disappointment lies in the scope of the monograph itself,
and in the manner in which Weber treats his material. His main thesis, that
the peculiar rationalizing propensities of the Western world have resulted in
a series of theoretical systems embracing tone, melody, and harmony that have,
when made manifest in chordal harmony, standardized instruments, and a
" rational" system of notation, permitted the development of musical works and
musical styles more complex than those developed elsewhere-this thesis is never
outspokenly developed. If the reader is not fairly familiar with Weber's other
work he is likely to miss the point, since the editors' introduction only partly
compensates for the lack of explicit orientation in the essay. To be sure, the
erudition Weber displays is tremendous; he utilizes as examples a wealth of
comparative historical material ranging from ancient Greek to modern Western
music, and from Ewe and American Indian music to that of ancient and modem
China and India. But it all amounts to a hodge-podge of miscellaneous informacion that contributes little to the exposition of his central concept of rationalization,
or "rule-making," as the major force in the development of Western music.
The purely social, as against rational, foundations of music are sketchily treated;
Weber merely mentions, in passing, some ways in which certain musical factors
have been conditioned by specific social developments. Thus, the piano attained
its importance because it made a nice middle-class article of furniture; soundbox instruments developed in the West because "the handling of wood in the
form of boards and all finer carpenter's and wooden inlay work is much more
typical of Nordic peoples than those of the Orient"; and the technical development of Western instruments is associated with organized musicians' guilds of
thirteenth-century Europe. But one searches in vain for the systematic attempt
to correlate social with musical values the title of the essay leads one to expect.
The reader beginning this book with the respect for Weber his other works
warrant is likely to be disturbed by the realization that, in constructing this
essay, Weber has confused the music of the Western world with its musicology.
This leads him to assert, for example, that the development of chordal harmony
had to wait upon the invention of a "rational" notation system and to imply
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consistently that rules somehow had priority over performance in Western
music. Even if we grant Weber's point that Western musicology has gone
fanher than other musicologies in tIying to make purely musical "sense" out
of music, we are still faced with the fact that the conceptual models produced
by the rationalized musicology of Western culture have bearing on the actual
music only when these models or rules have been accepted by the people
producing and experiencing the music, and even then only as there arise tendencies
to perceive the complex phenomena of music in terms of the models and to
force these phenomena to conform to the models. Western musicians, relatively
or completely in ignorance of the model-building of the musicologists. nevertheless create and perform music that is undeniably Western in style, and Weber's
implicit suggestion that the rules form the music must be rejected.
Willie The Rational and Social Foundations of Music was undoubtedly a
pioneering venture in the sociology of music, the editors' assertion that it "forms
a test case as to the values of sociological and musicological sciences for each
other" is happily not true. If it were, there would now be no sociology of music,
for Weber failed in this treatise to indicate much connection between the subject
matter of two disciplines. The real importance of this work lies not particularly
in its content, but in the fact that one of the greatest of twentieth-century
sociologists was willing to extend his researches into a realm of discourse that
in 1911 was commonly considered far removed from the province of the social,
political, and economic theorist. As an objective and comprehensive history of
certain aspects of musicological theory it has value, to be sure, but to modern
sociology of music it stands as forerunner rather than ancestor, and its historical
significance resides not in its methodological or factual contributions to the field
but in the bare circumstance of its existence.

Wayne State University

RICHARD

A.

WATERMAN

Literature and Belief: Englisb Institute Essays 1957. Edited by M. H. Abrams.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. Pp. xiii + 184. $3.75.
It is hardly too much to say that the size of this small volume is in inverse ratio
to the importance of its subject. The immediate question of how doctrine and
value operate in literature takes us inevitably to further questions, ultimately to
the fundamentals of literary structure and ontology. Though not until the 1920's
explicitly mooted and named, by I. A. Richards, the" poetry and belief" problem
is virtually coterminous with all literary criticism and, as Professor Abrams
points out, implicit in the many "defenses" of poetry (whether so named or
not) since Plato's attack. For these reasons alone it cannot be dismissed on
the grounds of its probable insolubility.
Six essays, with the editor's brief foreword, make up the book, four of them
from a conference on the topic at the 1957 English Institute. Two additional
studies by Professors Nathan A. Scott, Jr. and Louis L. Martz are from other
Institute conferences held in 1956 and 1957 respectively. Those by Professors
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Abrams, Scott, and Cleanth Brooks confront the issue in theoretical terms.
Professor Martz provides a case study from the poet's viewpoint by examining
Wallace Stevens' poetry after H armollium against his own statement that in a
disbelieving age the poet must" supply the satisfactions of belief, in his measure
and in his style." Aside from its explicative value, this essay is a happy inclusion.
It shows that the belief problem is not one confined to works which embody
readily paraphrasable ideas, but extends in subder forms even to so-called pure
poetry, poetry" palpable and mute."
For no poem, however" palpable" or, as Ransom has it, "physical," can he
really mute. Every created object, Father Walter J. Ong argues, is a word. It
shows thought, something true a fortiori of a poem since "it is not only, as a
totality, a word, but the stuff of which it is compounded is words" (p. 82).
Father Gng's essay will disappoint those who seek some critical modus vivendi
with poems whose predicates seem too overt for mere mythical acceptance,
where reader disbelief can be suspended only at the cost of some impoverishment
of the total aesthetic experience. He largely compensates for deliberately neglecting this central dilemma by discriminating between belief that and belief in,
belief as opinion and belief as faith. Behind the objective fonn of his creation,
his "mask," lies the writer's "voice," summoning us to an act of faith that does
not necessarily require assent to the propositional details of its structure. " If
we cannot believe in Prospero as a real magician, we can believe that the playwright is using him to convey some further word or truth to us" (p. 103).
But what kind of "truth"? There seems small comfort in Father Gng's admission that it "may be a very mysterious matter" (p. 102). But his argument is
more than a discerning restatement of aesthetic distance in existential terms.
It amply fulfils his aims: "to improve our perspectives and to reveal how limited
some of our common views of this problem really are" (p. 93). That these
aims are worthwhile is clear when we reflect that such pseudo-solutions as
Richards' "pseudo-statements" arise mainly from the crudely reductive way in
which the problem has frequendy been formulated.
Professor Douglas Bush, who seems in strange company here and confesses
that he does not "breathe easily in the rarified air of aesthetic theory" (p.33),
modestly confines himself to inquiring how far the non-Christian reader can
II apprehend and assimilate" the essentially Christian poetry of the past.
Since
Professor Bush himself can hardly be considered unsympathetic to Christian
values, let alone critically insensitive, nothing could more eloquently demonstrate
the complex embarrassments of the belief question than his profession of limited
response to Crashaw, to Donne's Holy Sonnets, and to Hopkins' "terrible" ones.
That he finds it otherwise <as do his students) with Herbert, Milton, and the
Eliot of Four Quartets he ascribes to their possessing an "experiential validity,"
a "truth to life," recognizable even by non-believing readers (p. 41). On much
the·same grounds Professor Abrams downgrades Blake's prophetic poems, Gide's
Counterfeiters, Lawrence's Aaron's Rod, and that most recent challenge to aesthetic tolerance, Vladimir Nabokov's Lolita. These come short of success because
they affront "the beliefs and prepossessions of our common experience, common
sense, and common moral consciousness"; they" require our consent to positions
50 illiberal, or eccentric, or perverse that they incite counterbeliefs which inhibit
the ungrudging 'yes' that we grant to masterpieces" (pp. 28-29).
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As Professo~brams is careful to insist, this is something quite different from
a doctrinal barrier between work and reader. The latter may without prohibitive
loss be waived. There is little new in his position, which sounds very much like
that from which the neo-humanists objected to Wordsworth. The notable
difference is that Professor Abrams is less open to the charge of separating content
and form. His requirement of moral and experiential soundness is posited not
as an end but as a means, as a precondition of artistic excellence. Though much
can be said for this view, it is scarcely a solution to the problem. (Professor
Abrams doesn't pretend it is.) We may ask for instance how it differs from
Eliot's celebrated test of coherence, maturity, and fidelity to experience, which
Shelley flunked so badly, and which, on closer scrutiny than it usually receives,
seems only to beg the question. To assume an experiential community among
readers is doubdess the best way of avoiding the dead-end of critical relativism.
Yet an objecting relativist would be quick to draw evidence for his objection
from this very book. Professor Bush, presuming that "full response to the
Paradiso is available chiefly to Christians," shares the secular reader's diminishing
enjoyment as he progresses from the first to the third part of the Divine Comedy
(p. 42). Yet Professor Abrams, who describes himself as II an infidel in partibus
fidelium" (p. 5), not only considers the whole work a masterpiece but finds
that one of the most theologically assertive passages in the Paradiso (Piccarda's
"In His will is our peace") can be II appreciated profoundly, independently
of assent to its propositional truth" (p. 22).
But for other and better reasons interested readers will applaud Professor
Abrams' contribution (as did this reviewer on its earlier appearance in the
University of Toronto Quarterly). Because it sets the relevant issues in their
proper context of traditional criticism and aesthetics and because it distinguishes,
by familiar illustrative examples, among various forms and levels of belief, it
ought to be required reading for anyone who would enlighten us further.
Professor Brooks of course explores the question within the organic formalism
primarily identified With his name. And in view of the many current attacks
on his theory-they range from the cogent to the downright uninformed-it may
not be amiss to remark here that three of his collaborators (none of them" new"
critics) accept without hesitation his familiar insistence that ideas in literature
subsist in a mode of inner coherence, not external correspondence. None directly
challenge it, though some imply or express important qualifications. Professor
Scott for example notes the "incorrigibly referential thrust" of words (p. 112),
which leads him to question especially the priority of the medium in poetic
creation. This heuristic notion of composition is a corollary of the formalist's
totally closed structure, whose very virtue of establishing literary autonomy
ironically enforces critical silence. Drawing on Maritain's Creative Intuition,
Professor Scott argues instead for the primacy of the poet's" vision," his intuitive
grasp of reality, which is not whimsical but rather "in accordance with what
are his most fundamental beliefs about what is radically significant in life . . ."
(p.123).

Some readers are sure to bridle at Professor Scott's further conviction that
this orienting vision is essentially religious. And even within the framework of
his own thesis his flat declaration that "criticism itself must, in the end, be
theological" (p. 133) seems unnecessary. His essay is valuable rather for recog-
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nizing our present need to define, in terms that do justice to Qur whole experience
of literature, that obscure mid-position that the verbal arts occupy between nOllaesthetic discourse and the conceptual innocence of music.
Professor Brooks himself raises the question whether in contextualist theory
poetry "has not won its independence at the terrible price of having detached
itself from reality" (p. 65). His answer reviews without surrendering the cardinal
points of his long-held theory. But he also meets the related charge that structural
coherence provides no criterion of appraisal: "Qur criterion for judging coherence
. . . is ..• Qur basic pattern of human nature. . . ." Without a belief in this
basic pattern, "the work of art is indeed incredible and monstrous" Cp. 71),
a conclusion which, like those of Professors Bush and Abrams, seems at once
irrefutable and insufficient as a solution. One recalls Eliot's observation that
literature must be defined, but cannot be judged, by literary standards alone.
But modern organic theory is no more successful than its less distinguished rivals
in telling us how to apply the extra-literary human constants, or even what,
exactly, they are. Nor can it of its nature do so, witness the fate of 'Vinters'
attempt.
Yet though the critics of Professor Brooks' persuasion have done much to
focus attention on this puzzle, they have certainly not created it. It is a very
real problem, always most insistent when criticism is at its best, when, according
to Matthew Arnold, it is truly "disinterested." But never completely so. The
authors of Literature and Belief remind us that literature is inescapably if
mysteriously involved with values. A criticism whose disinterest has become
sheer indifference will therefore not alone be incommensurate with its object,
but, like the phantom of pure poetry itself, have attained only the futile autonomy
of the dead.

Wayne State University

E:MERSON

R.

MARKS

Literary Reviews and Essays by Henry James. Edited by Albert Mordell. New
York: Twayne Publishers, 1957. Pp. 409. $10.00.
This volume reprints for the first time sixty-two reviews and essays published
by Henry James in the years 1865 to 1884. None of them will compel any major
reinterpretation of James as a critic, but each review is a characteristically engaging example of James's critical practice. Accordingly, we must be grateful
to Albert Mordell for collecting them, seeing them through the press with a
minimum of error, and accompanying them with full factual annotation. Our
debt to Mr. Mordell ends here, for his interpretative notes will not stand much
scrutiny.
These reviews are worth- having because they constitute the further adventures
of a singularly attractive mind, a generous but firm critical intelligence which
looks directly into the center of literary questions. They also supplement our
knowledge of James's interest in several authors on whom he wrote at greater
length-Turgenev, Arnold, George Eliot, Howells, Sainte-Beuve, Flaubert, and
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others. Except for the Arnold essay, which provides a rather formidable cata~
logue of the critic's virtues, these studies are all the more interesting because
they are partial, tentative assessments and not final statements of tempered
judgment. Most of them glance at an author's less imposing works-the poetry
of Howells and George Eliot, Flaubert's Temptation of St. Antbony, Turgenev's
Virgin Soil, some unrepresentative sketches by Sainte-Beuve; they therefore require James to stay close to particulars, to expose the specific grounds for his
judgment. Such reviews as these are valuable illustrations of James's critical
method and also indispensable {oomotes to the longer essays. A few of the
reviews have the special attraction of strangeness-an unsparing attack on Hardy
as an imitator of George Eliot, close critical evaluations of the dull piety of
Froude and Kingsley, the rather startling observation that a book by Louisa
May Alcott is likely to subven children, and searching examinations of such
improbable subjects as Monnons, Indians, and communists. But when James
attacks his proper subjects, when he states the problems peculiar to the historical
novel or prophesies the literary biographer's preoccupation with minutiae, what
he says is more fresh and pertinent than any remarks which any present critic
is likely to make on these matters.
James's first concern is always to hit off the precise quality of the author
under consideration. He tastes, he savors, and then he proceeds to. make concise,
accurate fonnulations which stand up extraordinarily well. Thus, he finds that
Renan is delicate and pure but his fault is "intellectual foppishness." Taine is
powerful but lacking in subdety; his images are stronger than his ideas. Gautier's
style is perfect, but he has the mind of "an intelligent poodle." Daudet is
"in two words ... the most charming storyteller of the day." Merimee's salient
trait is "reserve"; he is "a sly fox ... not a writer of rich genius." Turgenev's
"great quality" is "the union of the deepest reality of substance . . . with the
most imaginative, most poetic touches." Hitting off the precise quality is the
heart of James's method; it is the first and surest test of critical success. If
the fonnulation is correct, it reveals the true and permanent properties of its
subject. The next step is judgment, which may be of less permanent value, as
James himself often recognizes. When James proscribes an author for a certain
audience, notes that his own age has emphasized humor at the expense of sublimity, or regrets Stendhal's misfonune in being judged by "an English tribunal,"
he is aclmowledging the limitations of a particular upbringing, a par~cular
century, a particular nation. If we wish that James cared more for Stendhal or
Flauben and less for George Sand, we may take some comfort in James's
historical relativism. If a few-remarkably few-of his judgments now seem
deficient, he is no more than the creature of his time and no less than the most
discerning critic produced by his nation in his century.
In passing judgment, James invokes such criteria as form, verisimilitude, and
intellectual soundness, but his ultimate decisions issue from the organ of tastethe critical palate. Sooner or later, James raises the question of taste and its
opposite, vulgarity. His adventurous palate is receptive to a great variety of
writers. The versatility of his taste is best seen in little matters-when he appre"ciates the ingenuity of so fundamentally unsympathetic a man as Martin Luther,
savors the II humor and point" of the paragraph in which Renan fancies himself
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as the master of slaves, enjoys the Oneida Perfectionists' odd allusion to free
love, "one family relation." He is tolerant enough to entertain Julian Hawthorne's
intolerance of the Saxons, but what he will not endure is Hawthorne's inadequate,
unpersuasive expression of his intolerance.
Morality has become the most vulnerable of James's criteria, but his moral
judgments are as careful as any others he formulates. He often demands only
that the characters of a novel exhibit a decent capacity for conscience. He is
less concerned to find perfect dramas of poetic justice. But even immorality
need not be a simple basis for condemning a book or essay. Of a narrative that
reveals Sainte-Beuve to be II very little of a moralist," James can say: "To a
serious mind it offers perhaps more matter for reflection than any of the other
essays." He finds moral questions to be worth examining, and for that reason,
exponents of unexamined morality, such men as Froude and Kingsley, win no
praise from him. For James, as for the authors he admires, moral judgments
must be hard won, never easily arrived at.
Albert Mordell is a strange companion for an author of such delicate 'discernment. He exhibits just that grossness of. taste which James has in mind when
he assails "those who swallow without tasting." It would be hard to find an
editor less suited to appreciate James. Fortunately, lVIr. IVlordell saves most
of his misprints for his own annotation; he cites, for instance, a novel called
The Sacred Font and such critics as O. F. Matthiessen, Richard Blackmuir, and
F. R. Lewis. His writing is clumsy and inexact. He specializes in one-sentence
paragraphs, of which my favorite is: "James also refers to Renan's urbanity."
Naturally, Mr. Mordell does not know what to make of James's concern for
style. When James sharply attacks a critic named G. B. Smith for failing to
appreciate "the niceties of diction" and for using words like "spake," Mr.
Mordell, who gets off an occasional" nay" himself, tells us what the real trouble.
is: "James is captious because he differs with Smith in some literary opinions
in which James is wrong." James records at length his carefully reasoned objections to Hugo'S Ninety-Three, but Mr. l\1ordell rejects them; James, he reveals,
is piqued because Hugo" was a propagandist for radicalism." Elsewhere in this
very book, James shows how little his political conservatism colors his literary
criticism: he notes the decline in Wordsworth's writing after the poet turned
conservative and praises Taine's indictment of l'ancie'll reghl1e. Mr. l\10rdell
seems not to have digested these passages.
Of course, Mr. Mordell is not a professional author or editor. He exposes
as much when he claims for James" the right to write" or goes on to argue:
"Reading about them does not make for worse reading." But Twayne Publishers
is presumably a professional firm. I should like to know where its editorial
staff was when Mr. Mordell turned in his manuscript.
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